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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Canada are nations comprised predominately of
immigrants and their recent descendants. Many fled persecution in their
homelands and arrived in the United States and Canada with the hope of seeking
refuge. Unfortunately, in times of crisis, people in both countries have been
quick to forget that they or their recent ancestors were immigrants that were
fortunate enough to get inside one of the two countries' borders. Both nations
have repeatedly forbidden people attempting to seek protection within to enter.
For example, during World War Two, Canada and the United States largely
refused to admit Jewish refugees seeking protection within their borders.
Specifically, in Canada, the slogan regarding its Jewish refugee policy during
the period was, "None is Too Many." This was the answer given by a Canadian
official when asked how many Jewish refugees Canada would take.' Similarly,
when the S.S. St. Louis carrying Jewish emigrants fleeing Germany was not
allowed to land in Cuba, the U.S. government also refused to allow the vessel
to dock in the United States. 2 The S.S. St. Louis was forced to return to Europe.
There, Holland, France, Great Britain and Belgium accepted many of the
German-Jewish emigrants as refugees; unfortunately, many of the refugees' safe
havens soon became occupied by the Nazi regime.'
On August 30,2002, the United States and Canada completed and initialed
a final draft of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement, a bilateral
agreement generally requiring asylum seekers to lodge their claims in their
"state of first arrival," and not allowing them to apply subsequently or
simultaneously in the second of the two states.' The two countries signed the
Agreement on December 5, 2002.5 The Agreement was drafted to promote
national security in the two countries, to defend the integrity of their asylum
systems, and to improve their ability to control immigration6
1. The Canadian Council for Refugees, 10 Reasons Why the US-Canada Refugee Deal is a Bad
Idea, July 2002, www.wb.net/-ccr/l0reasons.PDF [hereinafter 10 Reasons Why].
2. See GORDON THOMAS AND MAX MORGAN-W1TTS, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED (1974); see also
Jennifer Rosenberg, The Tragedy of the S.S. St. Louis, The Jewish Virtual Libr. (1998), at
http://historyl 900s.about.com/holocaust/aa 1 1097.htm, reprinted in
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/stlouis/html.
3. See Rosenberg, supra note 2.
4. See Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Steven C. Bell, U.S. and Canada Complete Final Draft ofAsylum
Agreement, IMMIGR. Bus. NEWS & COMMENT, Nov. 1, 2002, available at
http://west.thomson.com/store/default.asp.
5. Laila Malik & Shree Mulay, No Room at the Inn: Our New Safe Third Country Agreement Will
Only Drive Desperate Asylum-Seekers to Take More Risks, Say Academics, GLOBE & MAIL, Dec. 24, 2002,
at A17.
6. The U.S.-Can. Safe Third Country Agreement: Hearing on H.R. 5005 Before the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, 107th Congress (2002)
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Unfortunately, as with the policies of the United States and Canada
towards Jewish refugees during the Second World War, if legislation imple-
menting the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement is approved by the
Parliament of Canada and the U.S. Congress, refugees will be put at an
increased risk.7 Refugees deserving of a grant of asylum under the laws of one
of the two countries but who first apply in the second country will be forced to
return to the persecuting country.8 This will happen most often if a refugee first
arrived in the United States, was required to apply for asylum in the United
States only, and then was forced to return to the persecuting country. This is so
because Canada's asylum laws are more asylee-friendly than those of the United
States.
This essay argues that the passage of implementation legislation fully
enacting the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would result in the
violation of international legal obligations by the United States and Canada, the
violation of the two countries' moral obligations to refugees, and the ironic
effect of potentially harming national security in the United States and Canada.
Part II will provide an overview of the Agreement, including background on the
Agreement, its objectives, and its application. Part III suggests that the United
States and Canadian governments have international legal requirements, moral
obligations towards protecting people deservingly seeking asylum in their
countries, and obligations to their own people to protect national security that
will not be undermined by the implementation of the Agreement. This note will
conclude by arguing that ideally legislation implementing the Safe Third
Country Agreement should not be implemented at all, or in the more feasible
alternative, implementation legislation should include greater protections for
refugees' safety, and should also include a well-defined plan for bureaucrati-
cally administering the transition, in order to comply with international legal
and moral obligations, and to adequately meet the Agreement's own objective
of promoting national security.
(statement of Mark Krikorian, Executive Director, Center for Immigration Studies) [hereinafter Krikorian
Testimony].
7. Press Release, Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, "Safe Third Country"
Agreement puts Refugees at Risk, http://www.ocasi.org/sys/anno-articlejprint.asp?AnnolD=36 (last visited
Sept. 27, 2004).
8. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Issues to Be Considered in
the Context of Discussions Regarding a Responsibility-Sharing Agreement Between Canada and the United
States (Jan. 29, 2002), at http://www.web.net/-.ccr/safethirdunhcr.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2004) [hereinafter
UNHCR Comments].
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II. THE U.S.-CANADA SAFE THIRD COUNTRY AGREEMENT: A BILATERAL
MEANS OF SOLVING COMMON PROBLEMS?
On August 30, 2002, the final draft of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement, was initialed by the United States and Canada. The Agreement was
solidified on December 5, 2002, when both countries formally signed the final
draft. The main objectives of the Agreement are the improvement of national
security, the improvement of immigration control, and the preservation of the
integrity of the asylum systems of the United States and Canada.9 The
Agreement seeks to do this by establishing a "safe third country" relationship
between the United States and Canada for the adjudication of asylum claims.
A safe third country relationship provides that a refugee may only have a claim
for asylum adjudicated in the first country in which the person arrives, and
cannot have the claim adjudicated in the country of last presence. In other
words, if an asylum applicant were to pass through the United States and then
claim asylum in Canada, the responsibility for determining the refugee status
claim would lie with the United States and not Canada.
A. Background on the Agreement
The notion of a safe third country agreement is not new. A series of
western European nations signed the Schengen Convention, the first safe third
country agreement in 1985, and implemented it in 1990. Since then, the number
of nations party to safe third country agreements has increased. The possibility
of a safe third country agreement between the United States and Canada had
been discussed as early as 1995." ° The United States responded to such
discussions by implementing section 604(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996, which, in general,
legalized the use of safe third country agreements in American law.1 At that
time, Canada was reluctant to legalize the use of safe third country agreements,
due to concerns that American and Canadian asylum law are incongruent,
brought to light in part by "vigorous objections" of scholars and bad publicity
from international human rights groups.' 2 In 1998, these talks ceased. In June
9. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
10. STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 1030,1031 (3d ed. 2002).
On Feb. 24, 1995, the two countries announced a Memorandum of Agreement entitled "Canada-U.S. Accord
on Our Shared Border."; Audrey Macklin, Cross-Border Shopping For Ideas: A Critical Review of United
States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25
(1998).
11. See Bill Frelick, Who 's On First? The Canada-U.S. Memorandum ofAgreement on Asylum, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 217 (Feb. 26, 1996).
12. See Immigration Bills Pass House and Senate-Refugee Cap Dropped; Summary Exclusion in,
Then Out; Limits on Legal Family Immigration Dropped; Asylum Provisions Relaxed, Vol. XVII, No. 3
2002, however, as part of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Canada
implemented a statutory provision allowing for safe third country agreements. 3
The talks between the United States and Canada which resulted in the
signing of the Agreement on December 2, 2002 resumed largely in response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The terrorist attacks mobilized a
movement within both countries for bilateral cooperation in improving immi-
gration control, in improving national security, and in preserving the integrity
of the asylum systems of the United States and Canada. 4 The Agreement was
signed as a result of the belief that such a document would direct politician's
efforts to satisfy the objectives of the recent bilateral cooperation between the
United States and Canada.
B. Purposes of the Agreement
1. For the Preservation of the Integrity of the Asylum Systems
of the U. S. and Canada
Proponents of the Agreement argue that its implementation is necessary for
preservation of the integrity of the asylum systems of the United States and
Canada. This argument is based on the idea that people who apply for asylum
in both countries are "usually illegal aliens [that] have broken the immigration
law and have no other reason [besides their eligibility for asylum] to be
admitted into the country."' 5 In other words, given the fact that many asylum-
seekers would not be allowed to remain in the United States but for a grant of
asylum, it is argued that grants of asylum to such people "represents a nation's
sacrifice of part of its sovereignty over immigration for humanitarian reasons." 6
It is further argued that, "if people who could have applied for protection
elsewhere are allowed to enter into the asylum system, the curbs on the nation's
sovereignty implicit in asylum can no longer be justified."' 7 Based on these
beliefs about the rationale behind the asylum systems in the United States and
Canada and limitations on these systems, it is believed that implementation of
the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would allow the preservation
REFUGEE REP. (Mar./Apr. 1996); U.S., Canada Temporarily Suspend Asylum Agreement Negotiations, 73
INTERPRETER RELEASES 724 - 25 (May 24, 1996); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED
STATES 454 (3d ed. 1999).
13. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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of the integrity of the asylum systems of the two countries by reducing the abuse
of their respective asylum systems. 8
2. For National Security
Proponents of the Agreement argue that its implementation is necessary for
national security, in part because it will improve management of the vast U.S.-
Canada border.' 9 It is argued that, "[a] better-managed asylum system resulting
from the incorporation of the safe third country principle would also yield
security improvements., 20 As an example, it has been noted that, "[s]ix of the
48 foreign-born al Queda operatives who committed crimes in the United States
over the past decades were applicants for asylum at some point, three of them
at the time they took part in terrorism." 21
3. For Immigration Control
In addition to the goals of preserving the integrity of the asylum system
and improving national security, proponents of the Agreement further argue that
the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement would increase the control of
the American and Canadian governments over immigration. It is believed that,
"[o]nce the option of transiting the U.S. in order to apply for asylum in Canada
is eliminated, some significant number of those whose objective was Canada
will choose not to come to the U.S. in the first place, opting instead to apply for
asylum in an EU country., 22 Speculation exists that there is a good chance that
in the short run there will be an increase in the number of asylum claims made
in the United States but that the Agreement will still help to control immigration
in the long run as the Agreement can be "seen as a first step in reaching similar
deals with other safe countries transited by asylum seekers, notably the member
states of the European Union."23
18. Government Responds to the Safe Third Country Regulations Report of the Standing Committee
on Citizenship and Immigration, (Citizenship and Immigration Canada), May 1, 2003,
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/03/0313-pre.html. (last visited Sept. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Safe Third Party
Country Regulation Report].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
C. Application of the Agreement
1. The Provisions of the Agreement
The Agreement states that, "[t]he Party of the country of last presence shall
examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee
status claim of any person who arrives at a land border port of entry on or after
the effective date of this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim."24 There
are, however, exceptions to this rule. In five enumerated instances, the respon-
sibility for determining the "refugee status claim... shall rest with the Party of
the receiving country, and not the Party of the country of last presence."2 5
These instances are:
1) When the claimant "[has in the territory of the receiving Party at
least one family member who has had a refugee status claim granted
or has been granted lawful status, other than as a visitor, in the
receiving Party's territory";26
2) "Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family
member who is at least 18 years of age and is not ineligible to pursue
a refugee status claim in the receiving Party's refugee status
determination system and has such a claim pending";27
3) "Is an unaccompanied minor";28
4) "Arrived in the territory of the receiving Party: [w]ith a validly
issued visa or other valid admission document, other than for transit,
issued by the receiving Party";
29
6) Or "[airrived in the territory of the receiving Party [and was not]
required to obtain a visa by only the receiving Party."3
2. Scenarios In Which the Agreement Applies
From this, it is clear that the Agreement will "generally require asylum-
seekers to make their refugee claims in the first of the two countries entered,
24. The Agreement Between Canada and the United States of America for Cooperation in the
Examination of Refugee Asylum Claims from Nationals of Third Countries, Dec. 5, 2002, U.S.-Can., # U.S.T.
# [hereinafter U.S.-Can. Agreement].
25. Id. art. 4, § 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. U.S.-Can. Agreement, supra note 24, art. 4 § 2.
30. Id.
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regardless of their desired destination."'" It is also clear that there are six
enumerated exceptions to this general rule. But, in what scenarios will the
Agreement, if implemented, actually have an effect?
First, the Agreement will result in people attempting to make claims at
American or Canadian land borders that do not fall into one of the five
enumerated instances of exception being refused entry.32 Second, the Agree-
ment only relates to people making claims at land borders, meaning the physical
geographical border of a country. Therefore, asylum-seekers that "manage to
cross the border (likely in an irregular manner) and make a claim inland will not
be affected."33 Asylum-seekers lodging claims inland are exempt from the
Agreement, as it only applies to land borders, and therefore can theoretically
apply in both countries.
Third, the Agreement will impact the large number of people who fly into
one country and then apply for asylum at the second country's land border,
having never attempted to apply for asylum in the first country. This is parti-
cularly common when asylum-seekers come from countries that do not offer
direct flights to Canada. These asylum-seekers fly to the United States, and then
travel to Canada by land and apply for asylum.34 Such people will now be
forced to apply for asylum only in their "country of first presence," which is
typically the United States.35 Lastly, the Agreement will not impact people
applying at airport ports of entry. Therefore, if traveling on a connecting flight
from one of the two countries to the other, the traveler will be able to apply for
asylum in the second country.36
II. CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTATION:
CAUSING MORE HARM THAN GOOD?
While the goals of the United States and Canada may include improving
national security and immigration control, and preserving the integrity of the
31. Press Release, Amnesty International, USA/Canada: Amnesty International Warns that New
Draft Asylum-Seeker Agreement Will Be Bad for Refugees, Bad for United States,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08l62002.html. (last visited Aug. 16, 2002).
32. 'Safe Third Country'Agreement to be Signed This Week, CBC NEWS ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2002, at
http://www.cbc.ca/stories/print/2002/12/03/refugee021202 (last visited Oct. 5, 2004); see also U.S.-Can.
Agreement supra note 24, art. 4.
33. See UNHCR Comments, supra note 8. See generally U.S.-Can. Agreement, at art. 4.
34. Art Babych, Federal 'Safe Third Country'Agreement Worries Bishops, CANADIAN CATHOLIC
NEWS,Mar. 17,2003, availableathttp://www.wcr.ab.ca/news2003/0317/federal 031703.shtml. (last updated
Mar. 12, 2003).
35. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6. See generally U.S.-Can. Agreement, at 4.
36. Posting of American Immigration Lawyers Association to AILA InfoNet at Doc. No. 02122641
(Dec. 26, 2002) (copy on file with author).
asylum systems of the two countries, the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement has serious flaws. These flaws are so great that implementation of
the Agreement as it stands would result in violations of international law and
moral obligations, and would endanger the national security of both the United
States and Canada.
A. Violating Requirements of International Law
1. Asylum in International Law
In 1950, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Statute of the
United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, which created the Office of
the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).3 7 The statute states
that the UNHCR has two primary functions; "the functions of UNHCR
encompass 'providing international protection' and 'seeking permanent solu-
tions' to the problems of refugees by way of voluntary repatriation or assimila-
tion in new national communities."38 In 1951, the United Nations adopted the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.3 9 The Convention deals with
protection of the rights of refugees within member countries, the Convention
does not, however, require any nation to admit overseas refugees.4"
The Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by the United
Nations in 1967, mainly to remove a stipulation found in the 1951 Convention,
which "limited the definition of 'refugee' to those who had fled as a result of
events occurring before January 1, 1951 ."4' The United States acceded to the
1967 Protocol, and as a part of that decision, accepted the 1951 Convention.42
The Protocol mandates: "no Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler")
a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life
or freedom would be threatened on account of [one of the five enumerated
grounds], race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion."43 In other words, it requires that member countries do not
37. G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., at 120 (1950).
38. LEGOMSKY, supra note 10, at 858 (citing GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 129-31 (1983)).
39. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter
Refugee Convention]. Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
Refugees and Stateless Persons, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 2545 [hereinafter Final Act].
40. LEGOMSKY, supra note 10, at 874.
41. ld. at 861.
42. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223. See I.N.S. Serv. v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 (1984).
43. See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 42, art. 33.
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expel or return a refugee to a place in which he or she will be persecuted. While
refoulment of a refugee claimant to a nation where his life or freedom will be
threatened based on one of the 1967 Protocol's five enumerated grounds
violates the Protocol, it remains unclear whether a country may remove an
applicant to a third country.
2. Can Safe Third Country Agreements Comply With International Law?
The Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol do not explicitly prohibit the
use of safe third country agreements. The only requirement under Article 33 of
the Refugee Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees is
that a country not refouler, or return, a refugee to another country in which he
or she would be persecuted under one of the five grounds enumerated in the
1967 Protocol. Indeed, none of the numerous cases of the European Court of
Human Rights that discuss the use of safe third country agreements in Europe
or international obligations related to asylum, directly question the legality of
safe third country agreements. 4 This allows room for expelling an asylum-
seeker to any country other than one in which he would be persecuted on
account of one of the five enumerated grounds. Under such an argument, a
person could be expelled to any country in which the person would be "safe."
The problem with such an argument is determining when an asylum-seeker
would be safe. Can a country party to the 1967 Protocol assume that because
another country is also party to the 1967 Protocol, and has signed a safe third
country with the first country, that the second country is safe? Does this mean
that a country sharing a safe third country agreement with another country is
presumed to be a safe country for any asylum-seeker from any group, regardless
of differences in interpretation of the obligations arising from the 1951
Convention and 1967 Protocol between countries? Does this mean that no form
of adjudication in the country in which the asylum-seeker requests asylum is
required, so long as the asylum-seeker is returned to another country party to a
safe third country agreement?
The danger that arises from the use of safe third country agreements is that
by removing a refugee to a state party to a safe third country agreement, the
refugee may be ejected after returning to the safe country. This type of action
44. Chahal v. United Kingdom comes closest to questioning the legality of safe third country
agreements, by stating that "states are.. .bound... not to send a person to a country where he faces persecution
or to one from which he risks being sent to such a country." 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. 413,489 (1997). Still, Chahal,
does not address the question of whether safe third country agreements are international legal violations per
se. Id. On the contrary, the Chahal decision, goes on to explain that as a result of international legal
obligations, "European nations ... adopt the practice of returning asylum seekers either to a country through
which they have transited in order to travel to the country where they are seeking asylum or else to a 'safe
third country."' Id.
is clearly prohibited by Article 33 of the Refugee Convention. A country is not
necessarily in compliance with the non-refoulement requirement of Article 33
merely because it abstains from returning an asylum-seeker to the country from
which he fled, and then allows that country to make the final decision regarding
the refugee's return to the country of alleged persecution. This process is also
known as indirect return.
The UNHCR has the "duty of supervising the application of' the Refugee
Convention and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 45 The UNHCR
has criticized the use of safe third country agreements by Refugee Convention
and Protocol member states that violate the non-refoulement obligation of the
Convention. In its 1999 General Conclusion, the UNHCR Executive Com-
mittee stated that, "policies such as those initiated by the EU, based on notions
of 'safe country of origin' and 'safe third country' lack, in practice, the
necessary safeguards to ensure that individuals are not refouled."
In other words, indirect refoulement is prohibited by Article 33. As
defined previously, indirect refoulement occurs when a state returns a refugee
to a third state, which is not the state of origin, where the refugee would be at
risk of further persecution, or even at risk of being sent from that state to the
country of origin.47
Non-refoulement is "the cornerstone of asylum and international refugee
law."48 To ignore refoulement and the effects it may have on refugees is to defy
the core objectives of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. Nonrefoulement
"reflects: '[t]he concern and commitment of those in need of protection the
enjoyment of fundamental human rights including the rights to life, to freedom
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to
liberty and security of the person.'"49
The chance of non-refoulement becomes more likely where there is a safe
third country agreement. Under a safe third country agreement, an applicant can
be removed to a member state, typically "the country of last presence." Then,
the procedures of that country are followed in making a determination regarding
eligibility for asylum. Safe third country practices rely on the presumption that
the country to which the asylum-seeker is being returned is safe. The practices
45. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 42, art. 2 § 1; Refugee Convention, supra
note 39, art. 35 §1.
46. See Jean Allain, The Jus Cogens Nature ofNon-Refoulement, 13 INTL. J. OF REFUGEE L., 533
n. 4 (2001); See also General Conclusion on International Protection, UNHCR Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 87 (1999).
47. Id. at 478. In addition to being a treaty obligation, non-refoulement is also recognized as a norm
of customary international law andjus cogens. See id. at 480; see also Allain, supra note 46, at 548-59.
48. Gerald P. Hecknan, Unfinished Business: Baker and the Constitutionality of the Leave and
Certification Requirements Under the Immigration Act, 27 QUEEN'S L.J. 683, 715 (2002).
49. Id. at 683 (citing G.A. Res. #, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/AC 96/815 (1993)).
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also assume that the asylum-seeker has the ability to apply for asylum in the
third country. Unfortunately, returning an asylum-seeker to another state
participating in a safe third country agreement can result in indirect refoulment
when the receiving member returns an asylum-seeker to the country from which
he had fled persecution.
3. The Agreement as Written Violates International Law
Although the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement was signed after
the United States and Canada became party to the Protocol, the Agreement does
not lessen the American and Canadian obligations under the Convention and
Protocol. This is because the Agreement states that it reaffirms the two
countries' obligations under the Convention and Protocol to provide protection
for refugees.50 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that,
"when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty
prevail."'" Given the fact that the United States and Canada are still subject to
international legal obligations, the UNHCR has raised concerns about the
general difficulties of successfully abiding by international legal obligations
while also participating in a safe third country agreement, due to the potential
for refoulement. Moreover, the agreement at issue is particularly problematic
because the United States and Canada interpret their obligations under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol differently. As written, the Agreement pro-
vides no explicit exception to its application for situations in which an asylum-
seeker would be ineligible for asylum in one country but would be protected
from refoulement in the other country.52
UNHCR addresses concerns about the fact that under the U.S.-Canada Safe
Third Country Agreement an asylum-seeker may be ineligible in one of the two
countries but eligible in the other, apply in the country of ineligibility and
therefore be sent back to the country of alleged persecution.53 "As a result [such
asylum-seekers] may be subject to refoulement."54
UNHCR notes that one circumstance in which this issue may arise is in
relation to statutory bars on eligibility for asylum. The UNHCR has expressed
concern that such bars are contrary to international law. "Those at issue include
the U.S. bar for failure to meet a filing deadline and criminal and affiliation bars
50. U.S.-Can. Agreement § 1.
51. Id. art. 31, § 2.
52. Article 6 of the agreement allows some wiggle room, through its allowance of the use of
discretion. Id. art. 6.
53. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
54. Id.
in both countries that are broad and automatic in nature."'55 UNHCR explains
that, "refugee claimants subject to a US statutory bar that has no equivalent
under Canadian law, and vice versa, may be required under the Agreement to
make a claim in ajurisdiction where they would be ineligible for refugee protec-
tion."56 As a result of these statutory bars, cases will arise under the Agreement
"where one country would bar an individual access to the asylum procedure or
protection from refoulement and the other country would not.,
57
UNHCR specifically criticizes elements of U.S. law that could result in
refoulement of asylum-seekers who may not be subject to refoulement in
Canada. UNHCR has raised concerns that such elements of U.S. law may be
contrary to international law. If the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agree-
ment is implemented, Canada's adherence to its international legal obligations
will effectively be gutted by default, due to cases in which the United States is
the "country of last presence" and decides cases in its jurisdiction under U.S.
laws that are contrary to international legal obligations. For example, UNHCR
explains that U.S. law may violate international law through its use of expedited
removal procedures. Under current U.S. law, 'arriving aliens' with improper
travel documents are placed in expedited removal proceedings. UNHCR has
expressed concerns about how this expedited removal process functions, given
the Office's view of the need for greater procedural guarantees to ensure that
bona fide refugees are not inadvertently removed to a country of feared
persecution (refoulement).58
B. Ignoring Moral Obligations
In addition to violating international law, the Agreement is contrary to the
moral obligations of Canada and the United States. In response to the mass
genocide of Jewish people who were denied refuge during World War Two,
"there has been a broad effort.. .to comply with the United Nations Convention
within their own domestic refugee law" by states party to the Refugee Conven-
tion and Protocol.59 Specifically, in the United States since 1947, "the basic
policy has remained the same with U.S. immigration law -- to provide a safe
haven for homeless refugees."60 This is particularly significant as the policy
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
59. Kristin E. Kandt, Note, United States Asylum Law; Recognizing Persecution Based on Gender
Using Canada as a Comparison, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 137, 140 (1995).
60. Id. (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 415).
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was implemented prior to the United Staes becoming party to any international
agreements regarding refugees. Rather, it arose out of moral obligation.
In Canada, in 1971, a "policy of multi-cultureness"' was implemented.
Additionally, through The Immigration Act of 1976, a priority system for
processing immigrant visas was implemented. The Immigration Act of 1976,
"explicitly affirmed the fundamental objectives of Canadian immigration laws,
including family reunification, non-discrimination, concern for refugees and the
promotion of Canada's demographic, economic and cultural goals. 62 Under the
priority system, along with applicants holding family-based visas, "Convention
Refugees and the displaced and persecuted (humanitarian category)" are in the
63first priority group.
C. Harming National Security
Although one of the primary goals of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement is to improve national security, it may, in fact, harm national
security. Relatedly, the Agreement could result in increased disorder at the
border and increased bureaucratic hassle.' Implementation by the United States
and Canada would result in a transition period, creating the potential for the
additional problem of having disorder during the transition. This could have the
ironic effect of harming national security in both nations. Amnesty Inter-
national has addressed this potential problem by stating that a likely ironic result
of implementation of the Agreement would be the undermining of, "orderly and
secure procedures at the border. When that door is closed, desperate refugees
will try to get across irregularly, putting themselves in the hands of traffickers
and becoming victimized yet again."65
61. Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Immigration Law and Policy: A Study in Politics, Demographics
and Economics, 16 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 59, 60 (1990).
62. Id. (citing Immigration Act 1976, R.S.C., Ch. 1-2, § 3 (1985) (Can.)).
63. Id. at 61.
64. Law Committee for Hum. Rts., Comments of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights On the
Proposed Safe Third Country Agreement, (July 24, 2002), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/refugees/comment safe-thirdfinal.pdf [hereinafter Lawyers Committee For
Human Rights].
65. Press Release, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Warns that new draft Asylum-
Seeker Agreement Will Be Bad for Refugees, Bad for United States (Aug. 16, 2002), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08l62002.html. (last visited Aug. 7, 2004). Interestingly, The
Federation for American Immigration Reform, a conservative, anti-immigration group, also opposes the
implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement. Dan Stein, the organization's executive
director has predicted that, "'People would still be encouraged to try their luck in applying under Canada's
lax asylum laws, knowing that even if they were turned away, they would end up in the U.S., rather than
home. At that point, they could begin pressing claims to remain here. As in the past, terrorists would be
certain to take advantage of a system that is unable to cope with a growing caseload."; Press Release, The
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Support for Amnesty International's prediction that the U.S.-Canada Safe
Third Country Agreement would undermine national security at the U.S.-
Canada border can be found by turning to the recent exodus to Canada by
hundreds of Pakistanis due to a change in U.S. law. This law mandated that
Pakistanis over fifteen years of age who are in the United States on visitor,
student, or business visas must register with the Immigration and Naturalization
Service by March 21, 2003.66 Resulting from the implementation of this law,
the movement of hundreds of Pakistanis towards Canada led to what The New
York Times has categorized as a "chaotic exodus."67 This law, which only
impacts a small segment of immigrants, has resulted in "jammed land
crossings... overwhelming immigration officials and refugee aid groups on both
sides of the border. '68 Implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country
Agreement would clearly result in extreme disorder. This disorder would not
only bombard American and Canadian officials, but would also have a negative
impact on other aspects of American and Canadian society.
Rumors of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement began to
increase border traffic before the Agreement was even finalized, when many
immigrants thought the border would be closed.6 9 The result was a wave of over
1000 asylum seekers to the one Canadian border crossing alone, from a variety
of countries, over the course of just a few weeks.7° In 2001, the same border
crossing saw 5000 people file asylum applications; in June 2002 alone,
approximately 1200 claims were made there.71 The Canadian border point of
entry could not handle the June 2002 influx smoothly. This large increase in
numbers forced immigration officials to work overtime and also forced refugees
to camp out at the border crossing.
7 2
Federation for American Immigration Reform, U.S.-Canada Refugee and Asylum Agreement Could
Compound Security Risks, http://www.fairus.orghtml/07409208.htm. (last visited Aug. 7, 2004).
66. "In December [2002], the US government added Pakistan to a list of 25 mostly Muslim countries
whose men are required to register with the Immigration and Naturalization Service." Nat'l Public Radio:
All Things Considered (NPR Radio Broadcast Jan. 28, 2003) (transcript on file with ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L). The use of the Special Registration Program recently came to a close.
67. Susan Sachs, U.S. Crackdown Sets Off Chaotic Exodus to Canada: Hundreds ofPakistanis Take
Reluctant Flight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2003.
68. Id.
69. Ingrid Peritz & Campbell Clark, Refugees Jam Border Fearing New Policy: Legislation Taking
Effect Today Generates Concern That Canada Plans to Shut Its Doors, GLOBE & MAIL, June 28, 2002, at A8.
Additionally, refugees also fled the United States for Canada in the weeks before June 28, 2002, the date on
which Canada's new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act went into effect. Id.
70. Sachs, supra note 67.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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Full implementation of the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement
would lead to great disorder at the U.S.-Canada border. It would require a
"whole new bureaucracy, 7 3 and during the transition to create such a
bureaucracy, increased disorder would result.74 Perhaps, some of the negative
ramifications for national security would lessen with time and increased
organization within the system, but the use of smugglers and traffickers would
continue even if an efficient bureaucracy were in existence.
IV. OFFERING A SOLUTION
A. Implementing Legislation Should Not be Passed
Legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement
should not be passed. Both the United States and Canada are obligated to
prevent refoulement under international law, specifically under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. Safe third country agreements do not guarantee that
this binding obligation will be upheld, as refoulement may still result, due to
differences in the interpretations of the Refugee Convention and Protocol by
each member state. Canada and the United States also should not pass imple-
mentation legislation as the two countries have moral obligations to refugees
that would be compromised by increasing chances of refoulement for asylum-
seekers. Additionally, if this implementing legislation is passed, it would lead
to increased threats to the national security of the United States and Canada.
This legislation, if passed, will lead to increased danger for asylum-seekers,
increased disorder at the border, and increased bureaucratic hassle.75
Canada's Parliament should be particularly reluctant to approve imple-
mentation legislation. Canada provides immigrants with greater protections
than the United States, and has affirmatively and consistently focused on
complying with international law and self-imposed moral obligations to
refugees. For example, Canada has taken a lead among nations by declaring
that people in danger of gender-based persecution constitute a social group, and
thus are eligible for protection under the Refugee Convention. According to
Canadian law, a "social group" is afforded protection under the Refugee Con-
vention. Legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agree-
73. Press Release, Amnesty International USA/Canada: Open Letter to U.S. and Canadian
Government Officials, Amnesty International, http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/ usa08152002.html.
(last visited Aug. 15, 2002).
74. The Lawyers Committee For Human Rights, for example, notes that the Agreement will "create
new inefficiencies, waste and bureaucracy as the U.S. and Canada each create, staff and maintain new
procedures to determine who is and is not barred by the agreement." Lawyers Committee For Human Rights,
supra note 64.
75. Id.
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ment would result in people with legitimate asylum claims being more likely to
be sent back to persecution, nullifying Canada's efforts.76 In addition, Canada
should be reluctant to implement the Agreement because such implementation
could begin a transgression up a slippery slope. If the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement is passed, the United States will likely attempt to make a
third safe country agreement with the European Union member-nations.77 This
would mean that after signing the agreement, Canada would be pressured to join
more third party agreements.78
Canada also should be reluctant to pass implementing legislation, as it will
result in Canada frequently having its own asylum laws gutted, and U.S. laws
control asylum by default, as U.S. asylum laws are narrower, when claims are
to be adjudicated in the United States under the Agreement.79 Implementing
76. The gross impact that implementation of the Agreement would have on Canada's stance on
gender-based asylum and its policy of multi-cultureless is indisputable. Even the Canadian government has
openly admitted that the negative treatment of certain groups of asylees would be an inevitable result if the
Agreement were to be implemented. The Canadian government has admitted this, despite the fact that such
a result is unpopular internationally and among many Canadians. "Even the Canadian Government itself
publicly acknowledged the unequal treatment given to refugee claimants in the U.S. In its 'Regulatory Impact
Analysis Statement' contained in the Regulations to the Border Agreement, the government recognizes that
the Agreement will have discriminatory impact on certain categories of refugee claimants. The Statement
admits: 'the proposed regulations will likely have differential impacts by gender and with respect to diversity
considerations."' Canada-U.S. "Safe Third Country" Agreement is Signed but Not Yet Implemented,
KAIROS REFUGEE AND MIGRATION PROGRAMME (Mar. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.kairocanada.orge/refugees/safeCountry/index.asp. (last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
77. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
78. In France and Germany, only persecution inflicted on the asylum-seeker by the government itself
entitles the applicant to asylum. Catherine Phuong, Persecution by Third Parties and European
Harmonization of Asylum Policies, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 81, 83 (2001). This means, "those fleeing
persecution by one of several rival groups, none of which controls the country, are not entitled to asylum
under German [and French] law... [Additionally, no] matter how credible the reports of persecution, if there
are multiple sources of persecution and the situation is too anarchic, German courts will conclude that state
authority has disintegrated and that, as a consequence, the asylum-seekers are ineligible for asylum."
Maryellen Fullerton, Failing the Test: Germany Leads Europe in Dismantling Refugee Protection, 36 TEx.
INT'L. L.J. 231,265 (2001). This interpretation has been criticized by the UNHCR, among others. Germany
interprets the Convention to an opposite extreme from Canada's interpretation; yet, if the two were a party
to a mutual safe third country agreement, Canada would send asylum-seekers who had first been in Germany
back there, due to its being deemed a "safe" country. Id.
79. Press Release, Amnesty International, USA/Canada: Open Letter to U.S. and Canadian
Government Officials (last visited Aug. 15, 2002), http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/2002/usa08152002.html.
Chris McGann, New Agreement May Reduce Number ofAsylum Seekers, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May
24, 2003, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/123472_canada24.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2004) [hereinafter
New Agreement].; For example, the U.S. requires asylees to demonstrate that they are applying for asylum
within one year of entry to the U.S., while Canada does not. In the past, this has meant that those with bona
fide asylum claims who have been in the U.S. for less than one year, but are without documents proving that
they have been in the U.S. for less than one year, have been unable to earn grants of asylum in the U.S.; they
have, however, then been able to go to Canada and successfully assert asylum claims there. If the Agreement
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legislation is currently being addressed by the Canadian Parliament.80 It is parti-
cularly important during this period for the UNHCR and NGOs to focus efforts
on encouraging Canada's Parliament not to pass such legislation. It is also
critical for the Canadian Parliament to consider the potential consequences of
such legislation on Canada's international and moral obligations, and national
security.
B. If Implementation Legislation Is Passed, It Should Be Passed With
Reservations
Despite all this, implementation legislation will likely be passed. Current-
ly, the issue of passing legislation implementing the goals of the Agreement is
being discussed in Canada's Parliament and the U.S. Congress.8 In regards to
the European Union's Conventions, "A representative of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that 'the safe third country rules are
here to stay, in one form or another. '''82 Additionally, the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees states that it, "focuses its energies not
on eliminating the practice, but on providing guidelines for its improved
implementation."83 Such agreements are already prevalent in Europe.84 Less
as written is implemented, asylum applicants who lack documents proving that they entered the U.S. within
one year will, in most cases, no longer be able to receive a grant of asylum in the U.S. or Canada. Id.
80. It should be noted that while the U.S.-Canada Safe Third Country Agreement has not yet been
implemented, the use of an informal system with a similar initial result has commenced. Due to the large
number of asylum applicants departing from the U.S. and presenting themselves at the Canadian border, in
February 2003 Canada began to require appointments with border officials in Canada prior to allowing asylees
to enter Canada. When they are told to go back to the U.S. and to come back at a later date, often the
following day, Homeland Security officials in the U.S. arrest them upon their return. Francis X. Donnelly,
Refugees Seek Safe Harbor in Canada, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 4, 2003. These asylum applicants are then
allowed to apply for asylum in the U.S., but are often detained until their asylum hearings before immigration
judges unless they come up with adequate bond money. While, unlike under the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement in theory these applicants may apply in asylum in Canada if they are denied asylum in
the U.S., as under the Agreement, they are not given the option to chose which country to apply in first and
thus if granted asylum in the first country must immigrate to that country. Also, if they are denied asylum and
are ordered removed from the U.S. not on their own recognizance (e.g., if they are denied voluntary
departure), the result is the same, and they will be returned to their country of citizenship. Id.
81. Krikorian Testimony, supra note 6.
82. UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
83. Id.
84. Convention Applying the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 Between the Governments of
the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic, on the
Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders, June 19, 1990, 30 LL.M. 84 [hereinafter Schengen
Convention]; see also Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum
Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, June 15, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 427 [hereinafter
Dublin Convention] Additionally, in 1992, the Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions
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broad-reaching but similar agreements in other regions are also starting to
emerge that involve other regions.85
Still, legislation implementing the Agreement as written should not be
passed. Implementation would mean that persons seeking refugee status in the
United States prior to seeking it in Canada would be subject to the laws of the
United States, and those that first arrived in Canada would be subject to the laws
of the United States. For Canada, whose asylum laws are less stringent than
those of the United States, implementation of the Agreement would mean
modifying Canada's own laws to parallel those of the United States. In order
to preserve its own laws, Canada should impose exceptions to the instances in
which the Agreement would be implemented.
Canada should include an exception to the Agreement as it stands for
applicants who make gender-based persecution claims as members of a parti-
cular social group before passing implementation legislation. Canada has made
it a social obligation to recognize gender-based persecution under the
enumerated category of particular social group.86 If Canada the United States
on this issue it will likely be met with success, or even with the slight loosening
of U.S. asylum laws, as U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft is currently
"considering new gender-persecution regulations for asylum seekers," for use
in the United States.87 Second, Canada should demand an exception for cases
in which the United States would detain an asylum-seeker just as it would detain
Concerning Host Third Countries (The Resolution on Host Third Countries) was adopted. Due to the
introduction of The Resolution on Host Third Countries and increased European Union membership, the use
of safe country agreements has greatly expanded. In fact, "'expulsion to a third State is no longer the
exception but the rule."' Gretchen Borchelt, Note, The Safe Third Country Practice in the European Union:
A MisguidedApproach to Asylum Law and a Violation ofInternational Human Rights Standards, 33 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 473, 498 (2002).
85. For example, in January 2003, Switzerland and Senegal signed an agreement allowing
"Switzerland to deport to Senegal any West African whose asylum application has been rejected and whose
country of origin is not clear... The Swiss say the agreement is a first step in combating human traffickers
operating in West Africa." Swiss Sign Pact to Curb the Rise of Political Asylum Requests, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
19, 2003.
86. There are five enumerated categories under which an applicant is entitled to asylum under the
Protocol: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and membership in a particular social group. Refugee
Convention, supra note 39.
87. George Lardner, Jr., Ashcroft Reconsiders Asylum Granted to Abused Guatemalan: New
Regulations Could Affect Gender-Based Persecution, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2003, at A02. Attorney General
Ashcrofi is not only considering new gender-persecution regulations, but also reconsidering a Board of
Immigration Appeals case from 1999, In re R-A-, 22 1 & N Dec. 906 (1999) (vacated Jan. 19, 2001), in which
the Board found that the respondent, Rodi Alvarado, was credible but that the rape, beating, and vows to kill
Ms. Alvarado inflicted upon her by her husband did not "qualify" her for asylum. Id. While Attorney General
Ashcrofi did vacate the decision in R-A-, he has not yet approved any gender-based guidelines. The fact that
this issue is under consideration in the United States makes it an issue that Canada could pressure the United
States about prior to implementing the Agreement.
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a convicted criminal. Canada should also exert pressure onto the United States,
urging it to provide an exception to the Agreement for asylum-seekers who
would be detained and would not be guaranteed counsel, as it is frequently hard
for detained asylum-seekers to find counsel in the United States.88 Lastly, "the
applicant should be able to challenge-in an individual procedure-the pre-
sumption that he or she could find safety in the third country., 89 Such a safe-
guard should be an explicit part of any implementation legislation passed by
either country.
The United Kingdom's Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 contained a
provision allowing for the use of safe third country agreements. This provision
allowed:
a person who ha[d] made a claim for asylum [to be] removed from
the United Kingdom if, inter alia, the Secretary of States certifie[d]
that in his opinion 'the government of that country or territory would
not send him to another country or territory otherwise than in accor-
dance with the Convention.' 90
Clearly, the British Act lacked an explicit statutory provision addressing
whether an applicant could challenge the presumption that he or she could fmd
safety in a third country. In other words, the statute did not explicitly state
whether the third country's interpretation of the Refugee Convention or the
British interpretation of the Refugee Convention dominated such conflicts,
when the two countries interpreted their obligations under international law
differently. Thus, in the United Kingdom, a court case arose dealing with the
issue, Regina v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Adan,
which was appealed up to the House of Lords.9" The House of Lords found that
in order to prevent the usurption of British asylum law, it was necessary to
allow asylum-seekers to challenge whether an asylum-seeker would be safe in
the third country.92 The House of Lords eventually came to a decision on this
88. 10 Reasons Why, supra note 1; see also UNHCR Comments, supra note 8.
89. Borchelt, supra note 86, at 515.
90. Regina v. Sec "y of Slate for the Home Dep 't, Ex parte Adan, 40 A.C. 727, 728 (HL. 2001)
(citing The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 § 2(2)(c)(1996)).
91. Id.
92. In Adan, Lord Slynn stated that, "the sole or core question is therefore whether as a matter of
law it is open to the Secretary of State to certify that in his opinion that condition has been fulfilled... [or in
the case at hand, can] he as a matter of law say that the government of Germany and France would not send
Adan or Aitseguer back respectively to Somalia and Algeria 'otherwise than in accordance with the
Convention."' Id. at 728. Lord Slynn then found that, "the question is not whether the Secretary of State
thinks that the alternative view is reasonable or permissible or legitimate or arguable but whether the Secretary
of State is satisfied that the application of the other state's interpretation of the Convention would mean that
issue, but it did not impact the parties at issue. The asylum-applicants were sent
back to "safe" countries which would later return them to the potentially
persecuting countries before the case was heard by the House of Lords. In order
to avoid such errors, if legislation implementing the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement is implemented, Canada and the United States should each
include explicit statutory provisions allowing for an asylum-seeker to challenge
the presumption that he or she could find safety in the third country in their
respective implementation legislation. Currently, Article 6 of the Agreement
allows room for discretion, but what constitutes discretion is undefined.93
V. CONCLUSION
Now the United States and Canada have signed the U.S.-Canada Safe Third
Country Agreement, enacting a bilateral possibility that has been talked about
in North America since the mid-nineties. The Agreement, which has sparked
much debate among scholars, immigrants' rights activists and politicians, is
coming closer to being a reality. To comply with their international legal and
moral obligations, and for the sake of the preservation of national security, the
United States and Canada must not implement the Agreement.
While in the context of today's terrorism-fearing climate a safe third
country agreement appears rational on its face, the resulting negative ramifica-
tions outweigh the justifications for the Agreement. In Europe, there has been
an increase in the number of countries party to safe third country agreements.
Under these agreements, if a person from within a European member country
applies for asylum in another member country, the application will automati-
cally be denied as it will be assumed that all member countries adequately
promote human rights and their individual asylum systems. Additionally, if a
person from a non-member country, most commonly Eastern Europe, Asia or
Africa, enters from the east, the person must apply for asylum in one country
only, the first country the person enters. As more and more countries become
members of the agreements, less and less asylum-seekers will be able to have
their claims for asylum fully adjudicated in a manner consistent with the legal
obligations found in the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
the individual will still not be sent back otherwise than in accordance with the Convention." Id. Lord Slynn
also addressed the concern that such an interpretation of England's role within its safe third country
agreements, which included its relationship with Germany which was at issue, could negatively impact
relations between the two countries or any pair of countries. He stated, "If some other states interpret the
Convention differently in a way which he considers not to be in compliance with the Convention he must
carry out his obligations in the way in which he is advised or is told by the courts is right. To do so is not in
any way contrary to the comity of nations or offensive to other states who interpret it differently and it does
not begin to suggest malafides on their part." Id. at 729.
93. U.S.-Can. Agreement, supra note 24, art. §6.
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This dangerous trend is reminiscent of the trends that led to the failed
attempts by European Jews to enter other countries during World War Two, in
order to avoid persecution. Most countries, including the United States and
Canada, largely turned a blind eye to these people. As more and more countries
sign safe third country agreements, even if a country wishes to help asylum-
seekers, it will likely feel no obligation to.
The Canadian Council For Refugees has noted the similarity between the
denial of protection of Jews fleeing Nazi persecution and the U.S.-Canada
agreement by stating, "during the Second World War, Canada denied protection
to Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution. The slogan from that period was,
'None is Too Many!' the answer given by a Canadian official when asked how
many Jewish refugees Canada would take." The Canadian Council for
Refugees calls the U.S.-Canada agreement a "[n]one is too many Agreement"
because it is about keeping refugees out, "just as we closed the door on Jewish
refugees in the 30s and 40s." 4
If safe third country legislation is implemented by the United States and
Canada, the rights of asylum-seekers will be severely restrained. Though
Canadians have chosen to implement relatively liberal immigration and asylum
laws and practices, these laws and practices will become lost to asylum-seekers
who first enter the United States, and therefore become subject to the immigra-
tion and asylum laws and practices of the United States, particularly in the
context of specific claims, such as those of gender-based persecution. The
member countries of the European agreements have expanded, and it is likely
that with time these agreements in North America and Europe will continue to
expand. It is dangerous precedent to set up a system in which it is possible that
an asylee would have no safe country to turn to in a flight from persecution.
It is not surprising that in a time like this, when many Americans and
Canadians feel vulnerable to terrorism, that there is a desire to increase security
at our borders and to limit asylum. However, at what cost should these protec-
tions come? The United States and Canada are countries of immigrants, who
largely came to their respective countries to flee persecution and obtain free-
dom. It is no less important during these times than during other times that the
United States and Canada not inhibit legitimate asylum-seekers from seeking
refuge within their borders.
94. See 10 Reasons Why, supra note 1.
